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 Problems and Recommendations 
Crisis as Opportunity: 
Implications of the Nuclear Conflict with Iran for 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime 
The conflict over Iran’s nuclear programme represents 
the biggest challenge for international efforts to pre-
vent proliferation of nuclear weapons. For decades, 
Iran has violated the terms of its safeguards agreement 
with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in 
its drive to develop its own capacity to produce nuclear 
weapons. The current talks between Tehran and the 
E3+3 (Germany, France, United Kingdom + China, 
Russia, United States) end on 24 November 2014. But 
even if a long-term agreement can be sealed by then, 
it is likely to be years before international confidence 
in Iran’s peaceful intentions is restored and the coun-
try treated as the other non-nuclear-weapon states 
under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
But what is the impact of the Iranian nuclear con-
flict on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three 
areas there are major overlaps between the efforts to 
reach a settlement with Iran and general discussions 
about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules 
and procedures. 
The first of these concerns possibilities to reform 
and strengthen verification of the obligations of non-
nuclear-weapon states under the NPT. Secondly, both 
contexts involve efforts to limit capacities for the pro-
duction of weapons-grade fissile materials, specifically 
uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. 
The third aspect is the question of nuclear fuel supply 
guarantees, in order to convince governments to 
refrain from closing their own domestic fuel cycle. 
In each of these three spheres, the nuclear dispute 
with Tehran is likely to have different effects on the 
norms, rules and procedures set out in the non-pro-
liferation regime. The ninth NPT review conference, 
which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, 
offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nu-
clear conflict and discuss ideas for future development 
of the non-proliferation regime. 
The conflict has already contributed to clarifying 
the powers of the IAEA for monitoring civilian nuclear 
programmes. The Additional Protocol, which origin-
nated in the 1990s in response to Iraq’s treaty viola-
tions, has been confirmed as an indispensable instru-
ment for investigating undeclared activities. The goal 
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Problems and Recommendations 
of making the Additional Protocol the new verifica-
tion standard should therefore be upheld. 
In the course of the crisis the IAEA has also expand-
ed its capacity to investigate possible military research 
in non-nuclear-weapon states directed towards devel-
oping nuclear weapons. The NPT states should acknowl-
edge this development and confirm that military 
research is a legitimate target of IAEA investigations. 
It is presently hard to see how the progress made 
with Tehran on limiting sensitive nuclear activities 
can be translated into broader international norms. 
However, the NPT signatories should welcome Iran’s 
willingness in principle to restrict its nuclear pro-
gramme for the duration of a comprehensive agree-
ment, for example by not reprocessing plutonium. 
After the failure of various E3+3 proposals to guar-
antee the supply of nuclear fuel for Iran, the broader 
international discussion about the suitability of such 
multilateral models as a non-proliferation instrument 
has also ebbed. The NPT states should therefore em-
phasise that modest initiatives such as establishing a 
reserve of low-enriched uranium under IAEA control 
could certainly contribute to convincing states like 
Iran to limit their nuclear enrichment capabilities. 
Overall, efforts to improve procedures to control 
and restrict nuclear programmes will enjoy better 
prospects of success if they are based on a balanced 
approach. The majority of NPT member states view 
the treaty as a reciprocal affair where stronger con-
trols must be balanced by progress on nuclear dis-
armament. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon 
state within the E3+3, the strongest protagonist of 
nuclear disarmament, and a convinced supporter of 
effective multilateralism. Thus, Berlin bears a special 
responsibility for ensuring that initiatives to strength-
en control and verification of nuclear programmes 
put forward in the talks with Iran also reflect the 
interests of non-nuclear-weapon states in more dis-
armament and transparency on the part of the nu-
clear weapons states. The following specific recom-
mendations for German policy can be formulated: 
 The German government should press for all states 
involved in the E3+3 talks to pledge ratification of 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). 
 Germany should push for the clarification of a 
possible military dimension of Iran’s nuclear pro-
gramme to be so comprehensive and transparent 
as to permit the non-nuclear-weapon states in the 
NPT to assess these activities independently. 
 Berlin should ensure that Tehran is not granted any 
special privileges in connection with resolving the 
nuclear conflict, for example in relation to the 
supply of civilian nuclear technology. Preferential 
treatment could lead to a watering down of multi-
lateral rules and standards. 
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 The Iranian Nuclear Conflict and the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime 
 
Any resolution of the conflict over the Iranian nuclear 
programme will have considerable repercussions for 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Germany, France 
and the United Kingdom have been attempting since 
2003 to find a compromise with Iran over the question 
of how its nuclear activities can be more effectively 
inspected and limited in order to minimise the danger 
of military misuse. In order to restore confidence in 
its peaceful intentions, Iran will have to temporarily 
open and restrict its nuclear programme over and 
above the usual international legal requirements. 
Problems with the control of civilian nuclear pro-
grammes are neither new nor specific to Iran. Since 
the dawn of the nuclear age the international com-
munity has been discussing how to verify and limit 
civilian nuclear activities. The founding of the IAEA 
in 1957 and the agreement on the NPT in 1968 intro-
duced the additional question of how rule-breakers 
can be encouraged to abide by (or return to) agreed 
rules, norms and procedures (“compliance”) within 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme, 
however, has a different quality than previous non-
proliferation crises. Iran is not some insignificant 
nuclear newcomer (as Libya once was), but an influ-
ential regional power. Tehran’s declared ambition is 
to join the leading nuclear nations and gain access to 
all modern nuclear technologies. Unlike North Korea, 
Iran has not evaded international inspections by with-
drawing from the NPT, but has repeatedly and openly 
challenged the authority of central institutions up 
to and including the UN Security Council – whose 
decisions it still refuses to implement. Tehran thus 
challenges the nuclear order and its central pillar, the 
NPT, from within.1 And Iranian criticism of the non-
proliferation rules and norms finds an international 
hearing, especially among the Non-Aligned Movement 
1  Harald Müller points out that “intrinsic events” that lead 
participants to embark on “new paths” are especially im-
portant for the development of norms. Harald Müller, “Con-
clusion: Agency Is Central”, in Norm Dynamics in Multilateral 
Arms Control: Interests, Conflicts, and Justice, ed. Harald Müller 
and Carmen Wunderlich, Studies in Security and Inter-
national Affairs (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 
2013), 337–65 (350). 
(NAM), which represents the largest group of NPT 
member states. 
The approach to the Iranian nuclear programme 
has already influenced the development of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime, and will continue to do so, 
even if it is likely be impossible to translate solutions 
discussed with Tehran directly into the wider inter-
national framework. The history of the conflict and 
the interests of the main actors are too specific for 
that to occur. 
Iran-specific solutions have been discussed with 
Tehran in the E3 talks (from 2006 E3+3). The IAEA 
members (especially the states represented on the 
Board of Governors)2 and the NPT states parties have 
aired better general possibilities to monitor and limit 
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities as well as 
specific approaches for Iran to restore confidence in 
the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. 
Possibilities for strengthening the non-proliferation 
regime could arise particularly out of the interaction 
between the Iran-specific and general discussions. The 
crisis offers an opportunity to strengthen verification 
mechanisms and move forward the debate on ways to 
limit proliferation-sensitive fuel cycle activities. 
Whether and how opportunities to strengthen the 
non-proliferation regime can be grasped will depend 
largely on the outcome of the Iran talks and the im-
plementation of a possible long-term agreement. But 
an analysis of the overlap between the nuclear conflict 
and the non-proliferation regime is worthwhile any-
way, because it identifies fields of action where non-
proliferation initiatives are especially promising. Even 
if no agreement can be reached with Iran, it remains 
important to resolve the general problems that have 
been revealed in the course of the nuclear dispute. 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty forms the 
basis of such efforts, and the norms and rules an-
chored within it are the point of departure for the 
discussion about the Iranian nuclear programme. 
With 190 states parties,3 the NPT enjoys practically 
2  Germany has been a member of the IAEA Board of Gover-
nors without interruption since 1972. 
3  Including North Korea, whose withdrawal announcement 
of 10 January 2003 is regarded as invalid by certain members. 
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The Iranian Nuclear Conflict and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime 
universal validity. One elementary task of the IAEA 
is to monitor the treaty compliance of non-nuclear-
weapon states like Iran. The central venue for the 
debate over Tehran’s nuclear programme is the UN 
Security Council, which serves as the final instance 
for ruling on treaty observance and imposing coercive 
measures against rule-breakers. 
The Iranian nuclear programme will play a central 
role at the ninth NPT review conference, which takes 
place from 27 April to 22 May 2015 in New York. In 
the worst case the Iranian conflict could – as in 2005 – 
contribute to failure of the conference. In the best case 
the states parties could utilise progress towards resolv-
ing the nuclear conflict to strengthen the regime as a 
whole. 
Such a development would lie in Germany’s inter-
est. Berlin has always pushed, principally through the 
EU framework but also via other channels, to expand 
the international arrangements for controlling nu-
clear weapons. Germany insists that the conflict with 
Iran can only be resolved within the framework and 
on the basis of existing international rules. Its special 
role as the only non-nuclear-weapon state participat-
ing directly in the E3+3 talks with Tehran also gener-
ates special opportunities and a greater responsibility 
to leverage the nuclear dispute to strengthen non-
proliferation norms, rules and procedures. 
Intersections of substance between the talks with 
Tehran and wider efforts to strengthen the non-pro-
liferation regime exist in three main areas. Firstly, 
both contexts involve verification of civilian nuclear 
programmes and investigation of possible prohibited 
activities by non-nuclear-weapon states seeking to 
develop nuclear weapons. Secondly, both concern lim-
iting the scope of civilian nuclear activities. Thirdly, 
the question of what incentives non-nuclear-weapon 
states can be offered to refrain from developing their 
own enrichment and reprocessing capacities through 
nuclear fuel supply guarantees is relevant in both cases. 
 
The current list of NPT states parties can be found at http:// 
disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt. 
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 Iran and the Verification of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States 
 
The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme 
quickly exposed the limits of the IAEA’s system of 
nuclear safeguards. At a press conference in Washing-
ton in August 2002, an Iranian opposition group re-
vealed the existence of a partially completed enrich-
ment facility at Natanz and a heavy-water plant at 
Arak. The IAEA, which until that date had known 
nothing about these facilities, responded by stepping 
up its monitoring of the Iranian nuclear programme. 
Growing evidence also came to light that Tehran had 
been conducting military research to develop nuclear 
weapons and delivery systems. 
The System of Nuclear Safeguards 
Two questions are central to the discussion about 
verification of Iran’s ostensibly civilian nuclear facil-
ities: What possibilities does the current safeguards 
regime offer? And how can existing procedures and 
instruments for verifying the peaceful character of the 
nuclear programme be improved? Both these matters 
are also of wider relevance. 
At the beginning of the nuclear conflict, Tehran 
argued that the IAEA had no right to demand infor-
mation about activities that had no direct connection 
with fissile materials. It asserted that the research and 
development of centrifuges for uranium enrichment 
was only declarable if uranium was involved. Tehran 
protested that the IAEA was overstepping its powers by 
searching for non-declarable equipment and materials.4 
But Iran’s position was not accepted, and it failed 
to gather any meaningful support for its narrow inter-
pretation among the international community. The 
4  IAEA, “Communication of 5 March 2004 from the Perma-
nent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the 
Report of the Director General contained in GOV/2004/11”, 
INFCIRC/628, Vienna, 2004, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/ 
Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc628.pdf (accessed 18 July 
2014), paragraph 11.d. For an explanation of this argument 
see Daniel Joyner, “The IAEA Applies Incorrect Standards, 
Exceeding its Legal Mandate and Acting Ultra Vires Regard-
ing Iran”, Arms Control Law, 13 September 2012, http:// 
armscontrollaw.com/2012/09/13/the-iaea-applies-incorrect-
standards-exceeding-its-legal-mandate-and-acting-ultra-vires-
regarding-iran (accessed 24 September 2014). 
IAEA argued successfully that a comprehensive safe-
guards agreement did indeed offer a legal basis for 
verifying the completeness of the declaration of a non-
nuclear-weapon state.5 
May a state unilaterally suspend its safeguards 
agreement? Are such agreements only binding after 
they have been ratified? This was a second point of 
contention concerning the interpretation of existing 
legal obligations. 
Here too, the IAEA’s perspective won through: both 
safeguards agreements and subsidiary arrangements 
are legally binding, even where they have yet to be 
ratified by the respective national parliament.6 
If the Iranian standpoint had been accepted, that 
would have inevitably had far-reaching consequences 
for the binding character of subsidiary arrangements, 
and thus ultimately for all safeguards agreements.7 
Other countries would also have been able to suspend 
implementation of their safeguards agreements with 
reference to the Iranian example.8 The international 
5  This position is backed by the NPT. See “Final Document 
of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, NPT/CONF. 
2010/50, vol. 1, New York, 2010, paragraph 13, http://www. 
reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-
fora/npt/revcon2010/FinalDocument.pdf (accessed 24 Septem-
ber 2014). 
6  United Nations, Security Council, “Resolution 1929 (2010)”, 
S/RES/1929 (2010), paragraph 5, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/ 
doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/396/79/PDF/N1039679.pdf?OpenElement 
(accessed 7 July 2014). 
7  Christopher A. Ford, Iran, Nonproliferation and the IAEA: A 
Legal History (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, November 
2012), 6, http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/ 
attachment/1077/ford--iraniaeapaper1112.pdf (accessed 2 July 
2014). 
8  This is not an abstract danger. For example, the legally 
binding nature of safeguards agreements was at issue in 2009 
when one was under negotiation for India’s nuclear reactors. 
India insisted on the right to suspend safeguards measures if 
its supply of nuclear fuel was interrupted. The IAEA rejected 
this demand and insisted that safeguards agreements are per-
manent and cannot be suspended unilaterally. Oliver Meier, 
“India, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Legitimacy of 
the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime”, in Technology Transfers 
and Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Between Con-
trol and Cooperation, ed. Oliver Meier (London, 2014), 116–33 
(126). 
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Iran and the Verification of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States 
community’s firm response to Tehran’s violations 
avoided such a watering down of international rules. 
New Verification Instruments 
The course of the nuclear conflict has confirmed the 
importance of the Additional Protocol as an integral 
component of the IAEA verification system. States that 
sign a Protocol agree to supply the IAEA with addi-
tional information about their nuclear programmes. 
They must grant inspectors access to undeclared 
facilities and locations on declared nuclear sites. The 
Additional Protocol also expands the IAEA’s right to 
apply enhanced verification techniques such as air 
and soil sampling. The IAEA uses this and other data 
(for example from public sources) to generate country 
profiles that allow thorough evaluation of the plau-
sibility of states’ declarations. 
All of Iran’s negotiating partners, the IAEA Board 
of Governors and the UN Security Council have called 
upon Tehran to ratify and implement the Additional 
Protocol, with no effect to date. The IAEA insists that 
only on the basis of an Additional Protocol is it pos-
sible to verify that there are no secret nuclear activi-
ties or materials in Iran. 
In the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) agreed with 
the E3+3 in Geneva on 24 November 2013, Tehran 
accepted “enhanced monitoring” of its nuclear pro-
grammes.9 The JPOA also contains elements from 
Iran’s Additional Protocol, for example concerning 
declaration of plant and equipment. In addition to 
sixteen facilities and nine other locations that are 
already under inspection, the IAEA received access to 
five further sites when implementation of the JPOA 
began on 20 January 2014.10 In the Plan of Action 
Tehran also accepted that the Additional Protocol 
would have to be part of any overall package to resolve 
the nuclear dispute. 
9  IAEA, “Communication dated 27 November 2013 received 
from the EU High Representative concerning the text of the 
Joint Plan of Action”, INFCIRC/855, Vienna, 27 November 2013, 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2013/ 
infcirc855.pdf (accessed 5 August 2014). 
10  These concern two uranium mines and three facilities for 
developing and manufacturing gas ultracentrifuges. Some of 
the IAEA’s inspection rights under the JPOA extend beyond 
the Additional Protocol. For example, inspectors can demand 
daily access to the enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz 
to read offline monitoring equipment there. 
In the course of the conflict it has become clear that 
the Additional Protocol may not be enough to create 
confidence in Iran’s peaceful intentions. For a long 
time Tehran insisted on a literal interpretation of the 
verification obligations laid out in the CSA. Only after 
Hassan Rohani’s election in June 2013 did he, as the 
new president, clear the way for a shift in position. 
During his election campaign Rohani was already 
arguing for Iran to accept additional transparency 
measures in order to engender international confi-
dence in the peaceful intentions of its nuclear pro-
gramme. Under Rohani, Tehran dropped its insistence 
that the IAEA verify the civilian character of the nu-
clear programme using only the existing instruments, 
and gave a little ground on demands for greater open-
ness. The decisive question was no longer whether 
Iran would accept additional inspections as part of a 
long-term solution of the nuclear conflict, but only on 
what scale and during what timeframe such measures 
could be conducted. 
From the verification perspective, this connection 
between the intensity of verification measures and 
the degree of trust in a state’s peaceful intentions is 
significant, because it is the core of a reform of the 
IAEA safeguards system. Under its state-specific verify-
cation approach the IAEA has been seeking since the 
turn of the century to target its verification activities 
more efficiently, scaling back costly and labour-inten-
sive routine activities in states where there are no in-
dicators of non-compliance and where the technical 
basis for military misuse of civilian nuclear facilities 
does not exist.11 
In the absence of any sign of undeclared activities 
and given confirmation that the respective state’s re-
ports are correct, the IAEA can draw so-called “broader 
conclusions” for any country that implements a com-
prehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional 
Protocol, and scale back its routine verification meas-
ures there. By the end of 2011 the IAEA had drawn 
“broader conclusions” for sixty-three countries and 
was considering doing so for another fifty-one.12 
11  “Towards More Effective Safeguards: Learning Hard 
Lessons. Opening Plenary Address by IAEA Deputy Director 
General Herman Nackaerts”, INMM Annual Meeting, 18 July 
2011, http://www.inmm.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section= 
Evolving_the_IAEA_State_Level_Concept&Template=/CM/ 
ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=2971 (accessed 22 July 2014). 
12  U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Nuclear 
Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Made Progress in Implementing 
Critical Programs but Continues to Face Challenges”, GAO-13-
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Verification of Possible Military Research and Development Activities 
The connection between the IAEA’s state-specific 
verification approach and a possible resolution of 
the nuclear conflict could be further strengthened 
by making “broader conclusions” a precondition for 
relaxing sanctions.13 From the non-proliferation per-
spective this would have the advantage that decisions 
about progress in the nuclear conflict would be made 
on the basis of IAEA findings. Such a move would in-
volve a risk of politicising the Vienna-based Agency, 
but would also underline the importance of its state-
specific approach and its role in resolving non-prolifera-
tion crises above and beyond the concrete case of Iran. 
Verification of Possible Military Research 
and Development Activities 
Since 2003 the IAEA has been attempting to verify 
possible Iranian nuclear weapon development pro-
grammes. These activities have played a role in honing 
its tools, but also spotlighted legal and technical gaps 
in the verification system. 
From the non-proliferation perspective it is im-
portant to clarify any possible military dimension 
of the Iranian nuclear programme, for four reasons. 
Firstly, to reduce the danger of Iran secretly continu-
ing to work on developing nuclear weapons. Secondly, 
because a military programme creates a risk of prolif-
eration, even if Iran were to cease all activities con-
nected with developing nuclear weapons. Thirdly, 
because active cooperation in the investigation of 
possible military research would indicate that Iran’s 
claims of pursuing a peaceful nuclear programme 
are credible. Otherwise the continuing doubts about 
Tehran’s compliance threaten to undermine the non-
proliferation regime. Fourthly, an investigation of 
illicit activities directed towards producing weapons 
of mass destruction could form the basis for creating 
more effective verification instruments and pro-
cedures. 
These arguments for the investigation of a military 
dimension of nuclear programmes must be balanced 
against the difficulties and disadvantages associated 
139, (Washington, D.C., May 2013), 13f., http://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/660/654714.pdf (accessed 25 September 2014). 
13  International Crisis Group, Iran and the P5+1: Solving the 
Nuclear Rubik’s Cube, Middle East Report 152 (Istanbul, Tehran, 
Geneva, Vienna and Brussels, 9 May 2014), vii, http://www. 
crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20 
Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Iran/152-iran-and-the-p5-plus-1-solving-
the-nuclear-rubiks-cube.pdf (accessed 25 September 2014). 
with such a process. Two points should be considered 
here. Firstly, the IAEA operates on an ambiguous legal 
basis when investigating a possible military dimen-
sion. There is no generally accepted definition of the 
scope of the term “manufacture” of nuclear explosive 
devices as used in Article 2 of the NPT. Article 3.1 in 
turn obliges every non-nuclear-weapon to negotiate 
and accept safeguards with the IAEA 
“for the exclusive purpose of verification of the 
fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty 
with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy 
from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices.”14 
In other words, there is no explicit mention of 
verification of activities connected with the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons. The IAEA may investigate 
military research and development activities in con-
nection with declarable fissile materials, in which case 
the comprehensive safeguards agreements apply. But 
what if the IAEA wants to verify activities that could 
serve the development of nuclear weapons but involve 
no fissile materials? Many non-nuclear technologies 
must also be mastered before nuclear weapons can be 
produced, first and foremost: high-performance con-
ventional detonators, missile warheads and sophisti-
cated computer simulations. 
The legal possibilities for verifying such activities 
where there is no “nexus” with nuclear material remain 
contested.15 Some experts suggest that the IAEA can-
not act in such a case, while others interpret the pro-
visions of Article 3.1 such that the purpose of IAEA 
safeguards is to prevent nuclear energy being used for 
nuclear weapons.16 
Secondly, there is a danger of non-nuclear-weapon 
states receiving access to sensitive information in the 
course of the verification process. The handling of such 
data is therefore compartmentalised within the IAEA, 
with the five NPT nuclear weapons states receiving 
privileged access to sensitive information. There is 
concern that the E3+3 and/or the IAEA could take 
14  “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, 
Article 2, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html 
(accessed 5 November 2014). 
15  IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT 
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran”, GOV/ 
2006/14, Vienna, 4 February 2006, paragraph 49, http://www. 
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf 
(accessed 27 July 2014). 
16  John Carlson and Andreas Persbo, “The IAEA Safeguards 
Function”, VERTIC blog, 8 October 2013, http://www.vertic. 
org/pages/posts/the-iaea-safeguards-resolution-return-to-
consensus-547.php. 
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Iran and the Verification of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States 
decisions on how to handle relevant information 
about Iranian nuclear weapons research activities over 
the heads of the other IAEA and NPT members. Such 
fears are not entirely unfounded. The IAEA Secretariat 
has apparently occasionally passed exclusive infor-
mation to the E3+3 about progress in its talks with 
Tehran about a possible military dimension. Although 
the Geneva Plan of Action and the Implementation 
Agreement provide for the E3+3 and IAEA to establish 
a Joint Commission at expert level to facilitate the 
process of investigating military activities, it has to 
date played no role in the talks with Tehran.17 The 
IAEA Secretariat has yet to inform the IAEA General 
Conference or meetings of NPT states parties in detail 
about progress in investigating Iranian nuclear weap-
ons development activities. But withholding relevant 
knowledge from the states parties will create prob-
lems of inclusivity and erode the legitimacy of verifi-
cation measures. 
Given these procedural difficulties, it is quite 
astonishing how much progress has been made with 
verifying militarily relevant activities conducted by 
Iran. The case of Iran demonstrates first of all that 
research towards producing nuclear weapons may 
leave behind so much evidence that the IAEA will 
stumble upon it eventually, even without any sys-
tematic search.18 In recent years the Agency has also 
purposefully expanded its access to relevant infor-
mation connected with the development of nuclear 
weapons. These days it draws on a spectrum of infor-
mation including open sources and intelligence data 
supplied by third parties to supplement data origi-
nating from member-states’ declarations or gathered 
during inspections. 
The fifteen-page annex to the IAEA Safeguards 
Report of 8 November 2011 collated all the indications 
of a possible military dimension of the Iranian nuclear 
programme. According to the Agency, the compilation 
is based to some extent on information supplied by 
more than ten states parties, for example covering 
Iranian procurement activities, commercial and finan-
cial transactions, and travel movements. The basis for 
the IAEA to use such data is Article 8.A of its statute, 
17  Mark Hibbs, “Deconstructing Sherman on PMD”, 
ArmsControlWonk, 19 February 2014, http://hibbs. 
armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2527/deconstructing- 
sherman-on-pmd (accessed 25 September 2014). 
18  James Acton and Carter Newman, IAEA Verification of 
Military Research and Development, Verification Matters 2006/5 
(London: VERTIC, 2006), 20 f., http://www.vertic.org/media/ 
assets/Publications/VM5.pdf (accessed 25 September 2014). 
which calls upon all members to “make available such 
information as would, in the judgement of the mem-
ber, be helpful to the Agency”. The Agency also drew 
upon its own sources, including commercial satellite 
imagery and interviews conducted inside and outside 
Iran. The IAEA stresses that precisely this diversity of 
sources enabled it to correlate the sources and thus 
evaluate the information’s credibility. As a result the 
Annex is the most comprehensive IAEA document 
to date describing possible efforts of a non-nuclear-
weapon state to develop nuclear weapons.19 
Tehran initially rejected the PMD report of Novem-
ber 2011 as “unprofessional and absolutely unfair, 
illegal and politicized”,20 but has in the end come to 
accept it as the basis for clarifying a possible military 
dimension. On 11 November 2013 the IAEA and Iran 
agreed a “Framework for Cooperation” to successively 
clarify twelve open questions on the basis of the PMD 
report.21 
It is also open whether the IAEA will be able to con-
firm full Iranian cooperation in clarifying possible 
nuclear weapons development activities by the time of 
the putative conclusion of a long-term agreement with 
the E3+3. Should that not be the case, the E3+3 may 
find itself facing the difficult decision as to whether 
to make such clarification a precondition for signing 
a long-term agreement to resolve the nuclear dispute. 
The largest remaining obstacle is that Iran still re-
fuses to admit that activities to develop nuclear weap-
ons have taken place at all. One face-saving solution 
could be to publish the basis and conclusions of a PMD 
investigation but to keep its precise details confiden-
tial.22 Such a procedure would also reduce the danger 
of leakage of sensitive knowledge to third parties. 
19  IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT 
Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions” (see note 15). 
20  IAEA Board of Governors, “Communication dated 8 De-
cember 2011 received from the Permanent Mission of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency regarding the Report 
of the Director General on the Implementation of Safeguards 
in Iran”, INFCIRC/833, Vienna, 2011, paragraph 4, http://www. 
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2011/infcirc833.pdf 
(accessed 22 July 2014). 
21  IAEA, “Joint Statement on Framework for Cooperation. 
International Atomic Energy Agency”, Press Release 2013/21 
(Vienna, 11 November 2013), http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/ 
pressreleases/2013/prn201321.html (accessed 12 February 
2014). 
22  See for example Jeffrey Lewis, “We Don’t Want to See 
Iran’s Full Monty”, Foreign Policy, 15 September 2014, http:// 
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/15/we_don_t_want_ 
to_see_iran_s_full_monty_nuclear_weapons_deal (accessed 
25 September 2014). 
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 Limiting Proliferation-Sensitive Activities 
 
The biggest challenge on the road to a diplomatic 
solution is currently the question of a compromise 
on limiting Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity. The 
objective here is to extend the amount of time Iran 
would require to produce a nuclear weapon, should it 
to decide to break all its treaty promises and launch a 
sprint for the atom bomb. This timespan is referred to 
as “breakout capacity”. 
Breakout capacity is generally equated with the 
time required to produce sufficient weapons-grade 
uranium or plutonium to build a nuclear warhead.23 
But in fact a series of other steps would be required 
before Tehran acquired the ability to use nuclear 
weapons. For example, highly enriched uranium must 
be converted from gaseous to solid state and processed 
into uranium metal. The metal then must be machined 
into a warhead pit and assembled with other warhead 
components including conventional explosives and 
detonator electronics. The completed warhead must 
then be mounted on a suitable delivery vehicle, such 
as a missile. Washington believes that Tehran would 
require up to a year for all these steps.24 Finally, it 
must be assumed that Iran – like almost all other 
nuclear powers – would also wish to test any newly 
developed warhead.25 
One reason why the search for a compromise on 
limiting Iran’s enrichment capabilities is so difficult 
is because there are no binding international rules 
placing limits on the scope of civilian nuclear pro-
grammes. Article 4 states that nothing in the NPT 
23  The IAEA defines the relevant quantity as eight kilo-
grammes of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. In fact, 
modern warheads can be manufactured using smaller amounts 
of weapons-grade fissile material. Trevor Findlay, Unleashing 
the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA (On-
tario: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2012), 
70. 
24  Greg Thielmann and Robert Wright, “How a Widely Mis-
understood Term Could Doom the Iran Nuclear Negotia-
tions”, Slate, 18 June 2014, http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
news_and_politics/foreigners/2014/06/iran_u_s_nuclear_ 
negotiations_in_vienna_why_it_s_critical_to_understand. 
html (accessed 25 September 2014). 
25  As far as is known, apart from Israel and South Africa 
all states with nuclear weapons have declared their nuclear 
capability and demonstrated it by testing. 
“shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable 
right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop 
research, production and use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in 
conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty”.26 
For non-nuclear-weapon states, unrestricted access 
to nuclear energy thus comes with the proviso that 
they keep their promises to refrain from developing 
nuclear weapons and to conclude comprehensive safe-
guards agreements with the IAEA. All attempts to 
come up with universal rules about the conditions 
under which members may enrich uranium or under-
take other fuel cycle activities have to date failed. 
Below the threshold of a UN Security Council 
resolution there is thus no possibility to force a state 
to restrict its nuclear activities.27 In the case of Iran 
such a step initially appeared unnecessary because 
the country agreed to accept limits on its nuclear pro-
gramme in the agreements of Tehran (October 2003) 
and Paris (November 2004). The Iranian leadership 
terminated this voluntary moratorium by resuming 
uranium conversion in August 2005. Then, after the 
IAEA Board of Governors resolution of 2 February 2006 
referring the case to the Security Council, Iran began 
enriching uranium.28 
The Board of Governors had also ruled that Tehran 
must cease all enrichment- and reprocessing-related 
activities for the sake of confidence-building. Finally, 
in Resolution 1696 of 31 July 2006, the Security Coun-
cil replaced voluntary confidence-building measures 
with mandatory restrictions on the Iranian nuclear 
26  “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, 
Article 4, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html 
(accessed 5 November 2014). 
27  Security Council resolutions have been used twice. Fol-
lowing the Gulf War of 1990/91 the Security Council’s cease-
fire resolution demanded that Iraq declare and decommis-
sion all weapons-capable nuclear materials and all facilities 
capable of producing them. In 2006, in response to North 
Korea’s first nuclear test the Security Council demanded that 
Pyongyang “shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing 
nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversi-
ble manner”. United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 
1718 (2006)”, S/RES/1718, New York, paragraph 6. 
28  IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT 
Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions” (see note 15). 
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Limiting Proliferation-Sensitive Activities 
programme. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter it demanded: “Iran shall suspend all enrich-
ment-related and reprocessing activities, including 
research and development, to be verified by the IAEA.”29 
Iran insists tenaciously that its right to close the 
nuclear fuel cycle must not be infringed. But it is wil-
ling to accept limited, temporary quantitative and 
qualitative restrictions on its nuclear programme and 
fissile materials. 
Firstly, Iran has accepted limits on the qualitative 
development of its nuclear programme, and imple-
mented these until 2006 and from November 2013. 
Under the Paris agreement, for example, Tehran 
agreed not to conduct any testing of uranium cen-
trifuges or conversion equipment.30 And under the 
JPOA of 2013 Iran is permitted to continue research 
to improve centrifuge performance, but may not 
use more efficient centrifuges for enrichment. 
Efforts to institute long-term qualitative restrictions 
on enrichment, however, have scant chance of success. 
There are no precedents for restricting the develop-
ment of “dual use” technologies in this way. And 
because the efficiency of gas ultracentrifuges is deci-
sive for the economic competitiveness of commercial 
enrichment facilities, states are unwilling to accept 
such limits.31 
Secondly, there is a question as to whether and how 
the operation of facilities suitable for producing weap-
ons-grade fissile materials can be limited. As far as is 
known, Iran possesses no reprocessing facility,32 and 
in the JPOA it renounced the capability to reprocess 
plutonium for the duration of the agreement. It has 
29  United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1696 (2006)”, 
S/RES/1696, New York, 31 July 2010, http://daccess-dds-ny.un. 
org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/450/22/PDF/N0645022.pdf?Open 
Element (accessed 5 November 2014). 
30  IAEA, “Communication dated 26 November 2004 received 
from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Kingdom concerning 
the agreement signed in Paris on 15 November 2004”, INFCIRC/ 
637, Vienna, 26 November 2004, http://www.iaea.org/ 
Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf 
(accessed 25 September 2014). 
31  Enrichment facilities producing nuclear fuel for the inter-
national market exist in France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
32  Although Iran did conduct reprocessing experiments 
between 1988 and 1993, in which about 100 milligrammes 
of plutonium were extracted from fuel rods irradiated in 
the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
“Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC)”, website article, 
21 August 2013, http://www.nti.org/facilities/265 (accessed 
25 September 2014). 
also agreed to refrain from the technology in the 
scope of a possible long-term agreement.33 The future 
of the heavy water reactor at Arak is unclarified, but 
it appears that a technical modification could reduce 
the amount of plutonium it produces.34 
The nuclear talks are therefore focussed on limiting 
uranium enrichment capacity. That objective can be 
achieved by limiting the number of centrifuges, their 
performance, the quantity of input and/or the quan-
tity of enrichment product, or modifying the plant 
configuration. In the course of the talks with Iran these 
approaches have been pursued individually and in 
various combinations. 
One relevant variable is Iran’s current need for low-
enriched uranium to operate its light water reactor at 
Bushehr and the Tehran research reactor (TRR). Future 
demand will depend on whether the country builds 
more reactors, whether it converts the Arak heavy 
water reactor to operate on low-enriched uranium and 
whether it intends to export nuclear fuel. The Iranian 
leadership has also raised the possibility of producing 
highly enriched uranium to power ships and sub-
marines.35 
The E3+3 emphasise that Iran will have little legit-
imate need for low-enriched uranium for the foresee-
able future. The light water reactor built by Russia 
at Bushehr will continue to be supplied with Russian 
fuel until at least 2021. And Iran already possesses 
sufficient uranium enriched to 19.75 percent to oper-
ate the Tehran Research Reactor for ten to twenty 
years.36 
33  IAEA, “Joint Plan of Action: Communication dated 28 No-
vember 2013 received from the Permanent Mission of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency concerning the text of 
the Joint Plan of Action”, INFCIRC/856, Vienna, 29 November 
2013, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/ 
2013/infcirc856.pdf (accessed 25 September 2014). 
34  Ali Ahmad, Frank von Hippel and Zia Mian, “A Win-Win 
Solution for Iran’s Arak Reactor”, Arms Control Today 4 (2014): 
8–13. 
35  “Iran to Enrich Uranium to 50% if Nuclear-powered 
Vessels Needed – Official”, Trends News Agency, 13 April 2013, 
http://http://en.trend.az/regions/iran/2139956.html (accessed 
4 July 2014). 
36  Institute for Science and International Security, “Tehran 
Research Reactor Fuel Requirements”, website article, http:// 
www.isisnucleariran.org/static/444 (accessed 25 September 
2014); IAEA Board of Governors, “Status of Iran’s Nuclear Pro-
gramme in relation to the Joint Plan of Action: Report by the 
Director General”, GOV/INF/2014/16, Vienna, 20 July 2014, 
http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/ 
JPOA_IAEA_update_20Jul2014_1.pdf (accessed 25 September 
2014). 
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Limiting Proliferation-Sensitive Activities 
Iran’s negotiating partners therefore wish to 
restrict the number of centrifuges at the enrichment 
facilities at Natanz and Fordow, while at least Washing-
ton also insists on dismantling a substantial part of 
the existing capacity. Iran, on the other hand, argues 
that it intends to meet its own future fuel demand 
and must therefore expand its existing capacity. 
The attempt to link enrichment capacity to eco-
nomic need has little prospect of success because such 
demand is not objectively identifiable. A country like 
Brazil can justify expanding its enrichment facilities 
with the objective of exporting nuclear fuel.37 Or one 
can, like Iran, point to plans to expand domestic nu-
clear power programmes in order to legitimise the 
expansion of enrichment capability. Both arguments 
lead to highly subjective assessments of nuclear fuel 
needs. 
Thirdly, the nuclear talks are about limiting the 
quantity and quality of fissile materials kept within 
Iran. The time required to produce a significant quan-
tity of weapons grade fissile material depends on the 
quantity and quality of enriched U235 stocks. 
The focus on limiting enrichment capacities can 
partly explained by domestic factors. Several members 
of the US Congress have declared a substantial reduc-
tion in Iranian enrichment capacity to be the most 
important yardstick of American success in the talks. 
Iranian leaders in turn have declared any reduction in 
existing capacity to be a “red line”. There is a danger 
that this fight will obscure the question of effective 
monitoring, which is more important from the non-
proliferation perspective. 
 
 
37  Oliver Thränert and Sascha Albrecht, Die Multilateralisie-
rung des nuklearen Brennstoffkreislaufs: Wie kann die aufstrebende 
Regionalmacht Brasilien konstruktiv eingebunden werden? SWP-
Aktuell 31/2010 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
April 2010). 
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Over the course of the nuclear conflict many attempts 
have been made to persuade Tehran to cease particu-
lar fuel cycle activities in return for nuclear fuel supply 
guarantees. This occurred in the context of a general 
debate about multilateral initiatives to control the 
fuel cycle.38 
Between 2006 and 2009 for example – against the 
backdrop of the nuclear dispute – various different 
states introduced about a dozen different proposals 
for multilateralisation.39 But only the idea of guaran-
teeing the supply of nuclear fuel still plays a role 
today as an element of a possible political solution to 
the nuclear conflict with Iran. The goal is to reduce 
Iran’s need for domestic enrichment capacities. 
Iran justifies its plans to expand enrichment with 
the wish for greater energy autarky. Tehran has re-
portedly already asked to Russia to amend the existing 
supply contract to permit Iran to produce its own fuel 
for the reactor already operating at Bushehr. It is un-
clear whether Iran would be technically capable of 
producing fuel elements for Iranian reactors of Rus-
sian design, as it lacks the technical infrastructure to 
produce nuclear fuel on such a large scale. Moreover, 
the technical specifications of fuel elements are nor-
mally patented trade secrets that manufacturers guard 
precisely to protect their long-term supply contracts. 
Russia has also stated that its liability for safe oper-
ation of Bushehr would end should Iran use fuel ele-
ments produced indigenously.40 
38  A useful summary is provided by Mark Fitzpatrick, “Con-
taining the Iranian Nuclear Crisis: The Useful Precedent of 
a Fuel Swap”, Perceptions 16, no. 2 (2011): 27–42. 
39  Some of these proposals were based on the report of a 
commission of experts established by Mohamed ElBaradei. 
IAEA, Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert 
Group Report to the Director General of the IAEA (Vienna, 2005), 
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/mna-2005_ 
web.pdf (accessed 25 September 2014). An overview of the 
proposals is found in IAEA, “Revisiting the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: 
Multilateral Approaches to the Fuel Cycle”, http://iaea.org/ 
newscenter/focus/fuelcycle/index.shtml (accessed 29 July 
2014). 
40  George Perkovich, “Ensuring Nuclear Fuel for Iran Could 
Put the Country in a Box”, Washington Post, 10 July 2014, http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-nuclear-deal-with-iran-
should-focus-on-stockpiling-fuel-for-research-not-a-bomb/2014/ 
Tehran and Moscow are planning to build more 
reactors in Iran, which Iran intends to supply with its 
own nuclear fuel.41 Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said 
in July 2014 that Iran would need about 190,000 sepa-
rative work units (SWU) to supply its future nuclear 
power stations with fuel.42 At that point the operation-
al Iranian enrichment facilities had a capacity of no 
more than around 10,000 SWU. 
However, Iran cannot assert any urgent need for its 
own nuclear fuel, because Russia has to date fulfilled 
all its supply obligations to Iran and to all other coun-
tries with which it maintains nuclear energy cooper-
ation agreements.43 It is regarded as unlikely that 
Russia would depart from that policy, because to do 
so would cause lasting harm to its reputation as a 
reliable partner in the international nuclear business. 
Two concrete projects aiming to strengthen inter-
national supply guarantees are currently being im-
plemented. In November 2009 the IAEA approved a 
plan to establish an international nuclear fuel reserve 
at Angarsk in Russia,44 while an international con-
07/10/1389ae36-06e2-11e4-bbf1-cc51275e7f8f_story.html 
(accessed 25 September 2014). 
41  “Russia May Build Eight Nuclear Reactors for Iran”, 
Reuters, 22 May 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/ 
business_russia-may-build-eight-nuclear-reactors-for-iran_ 
348496.html (accessed 25 September 2014). 
42  Michelle Moghtader and Fredrik Dahl, “Iran’s Supreme 
Leader Calls for More Enrichment Capacity”, Reuters, 8 July 
2014, http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0FD0MY20 
140708?irpc=932 (accessed 25 September 2014). A “separative 
work unit” (SWU) denotes the energy required to separate 
uranium isotopes, and thus the efficiency of gas centrifuges. 
43  Even after the 2014 Crimea crisis Moscow avoided calling 
into question its deliveries of nuclear fuel to Ukraine. Kiev 
would naturally like to diversify the fuel supply for its fifteen 
reactors, most of which are type VVER-1000 like Bushehr. 
So far, however, attempts to produce fuel elements for the 
Russian-built reactors jointly with the US company Westing-
house have failed for technical reasons. “More Westinghouse 
Fuel for Ukraine”, World Nuclear News, 11 April 2014, http:// 
www.world-nuclear-news.org/enf-more-westinghouse-fuel-for-
ukraine-1104144.html (accessed 16 July 2014). 
44  Cole J. Harvey, “The Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Reserve 
at Angarsk”, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 19 January 2010, http:// 
www.nti.org/analysis/articles/uranium-fuel-reserve-angarsk 
(accessed 25 September 2014); Jonas Schneider and Oliver 
Thränert, “Dual Use”: Der schwierige Umgang mit Urananreicherung, 
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sortium intends to establish a fuel bank of low-enriched 
uranium in Kazakhstan. The idea: If the supply of nu-
clear fuel to a NPT member is interrupted for political 
reasons, the shortfall can be made up from this stock. 
Sufficient funding to realise the project became avail-
able in 2011, when a private foundation and several 
IAEA members provided $150 million. But bureau-
cratic obstacles still stand in the way of realisation, 
and in June 2014 the IAEA and Kazakhstan were still 
at odds over the legal modalities of this “fuel bank”.45 
Even the prospect of the fuel bank serving to under-
pin a nuclear deal with Iran has not accelerated the 
process.46 
It is debatable whether Iran would even be eligible 
to receive nuclear fuel from an internationally oper-
ated fuel bank. In order to prevent violators from 
exploiting such a mechanism for nefarious purposes, 
all proposals for multilateralisation of fuel cycle activi-
ties rest on the principle that only states that observe 
their obligations under the NPT and the safeguards 
agreements may be eligible for participation. In the 
United States there are therefore demands that Tehran 
be excluded until further notice from multilateral 
initiatives.47 On the other hand, applying weaker 
standards to Iran than other states would risk water-
ing down the principles on which the multinational 
fuel guarantee models are based. 
A similar problem could arise if a long-term agree-
ment contained arrangements for future cooperation 
in the civilian nuclear sector, without Tehran perma-
nently ceasing uranium enrichment and reprocessing. 
The United States has been working for some time 
to anchor non-proliferation standards in bilateral 
nuclear trade agreements with non-nuclear-weapon 
states. The George W. Bush Administration already 
made the export of American civilian nuclear tech-
nology conditional on the recipient foregoing enrich-
CSS Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik 151 (Zurich: Center 
for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, April 2014), http://www. 
css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CSSAnalyse151-DE.pdf (accessed 
11 July 2104). 
45  One reason for delays is that the IAEA has not been able 
to confirm the geological suitability of the planned facility. 
“U.N. Agency, Kazakhstan Seen Close to Deal on Nuclear Fuel 
Bank”, Global Security Newswire, 19 June 2014, http://www. 
nti.org/gsn/article/un-agency-kazakhstan-close-deal-nuclear-
fuel-bank (accessed 8 July 2014). 
46  Sam Nunn, “Open a Nuclear Fuel Bank”, New York Times, 
11 July 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/12/opinion/ 
open-a-nuclear-fuel-bank.html?_r=0 (accessed 25 September 
2014). 
47  GAO, “Nuclear Nonproliferation” (see note 12), 39. 
ment and reprocessing. Washington concluded the 
first agreement containing this gold standard with the 
United Arab Emirates in 2009. The Obama Adminis-
tration is using a more flexible approach, but is still 
pursuing the goal of writing the renunciation of ura-
nium enrichment and reprocessing into bilateral 
agreements.48 
The JPOA already provides for comprehensive civil 
nuclear cooperation with Tehran during the imple-
mentation of a long-term agreement. That would 
include the possibility to supply light water reactors 
to Iran without seeking a complete end to Iranian 
uranium enrichment.49 Members of Congress there-
fore accuse the Obama Administration of watering 
down its own gold standard.50 From the non-prolifer-
ation perspective it would certainly be desirable for 
potential supplier states to impose the strictest stand-
ards on nuclear trade with Iran. 
 
 
48  Schneider and Thränert, “Dual Use” (see note 44). 
49  The cooperation is to include the possibility for Iran to 
purchase modern light water and research reactors, supply of 
nuclear fuel, and cooperation on research and development. 
50  Elaine M. Grossman, “Royce: White House in ‘Dramatic 
Retreat’ from Security Norms in Nuclear Trade”, Global Security 
Newswire, 10 July 2014, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/royce-
white-house-dramatic-retreat-security-norms-nuclear-trade 
(accessed 25 September 2014). 
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The Geneva Plan of Action of 24 November 2013 states 
that a long-term agreement with Iran should “reflect 
the rights and obligations of parties to the NPT and 
IAEA Safeguards Agreements”.51 And after it expires 
the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated no 
differently than the nuclear programme of any other 
NPT non-nuclear-weapon state. That would end the 
special treatment of Tehran. 
The outcome of the E3+3 talks – and if an agree-
ment is reached, also the success or failure of a Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action – will also have a deci-
sive influence on broader efforts to control and reduce 
nuclear weapons. If the negotiations fail on 24 Novem-
ber 2014, there is little hope of strengthening the non-
proliferation regime. If twelve years of talks cannot 
bring Iran back into the multilateral fold, that would 
be a body-blow for the NPT as a whole. After North 
Korea’s withdrawal in 2003 this would be the second 
failure to resolve a major proliferation crisis on the 
basis of international norms, rules and procedures. 
International pressure would probably lead Iran to 
become a “spoiler” in the non-proliferation regime 
once again.52 Under such circumstances the next NPT 
review conference in 2015 would probably become 
largely a damage-limitation exercise concerned with 
reducing Tehran’s influence and avoiding a repeat 
of the 2005 failure to produce a final document. 
If, on the other hand, the negotiations are extended 
beyond 24 November 2014, that could play a role in 
making Iran more cooperative than at the last two re-
view conferences. That would still apply if the E3+3 
and Iran agreed on certain elements but continued to 
talk on points of controversy. In that case the NPT 
members should highlight and confirm the progress 
already achieved. 
A long-term agreement resolving the nuclear con-
flict would be the best precondition for a successful 
review conference and for all efforts to strengthen the 
non-proliferation regime. Such an outcome would 
51  IAEA, “Communication […] concerning the text of the 
Joint Plan of Action” (see note 9). 
52  Yvonne Yew, Diplomacy and Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Navi-
gating the Non-Aligned Movement, Discussion Paper 2011–7 
(Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International 
Affairs, June 2011). 
demonstrate that the existing mechanisms possess 
the potential to resolve important and complex non-
proliferation crises. 
In that event, there would be no reason why Iran 
could not act as a responsible non-nuclear-weapon 
state. In fact, in order to avoid being “singled out” 
or appearing to make one-sided concessions, it might 
even be interested in generalising a number of the 
special obligations imposed upon it. Despite radical 
rhetoric, Tehran has in the past occasionally cooperat-
ed in promoting arms control regimes. For Tehran, the 
role of a “fundamentalist norm renovator” could offer 
a way out of the legitimacy dilemma that looms if it 
continues to express fundamental criticism of double 
standards in the non-proliferation regime yet at the 
same time accepts certain aspects of that regime when 
implementing a long-term agreement.53 
The signing of a comprehensive agreement would 
also be a confirmation of the European and German 
policies, which have always upheld the objective of a 
diplomatic solution.54 The chances of strengthening 
cooperative non-proliferation efforts and thus effective 
multilateralism would be greatest if Iran were willing 
to support such efforts – or at least not stand in their 
way. 
A long-term agreement would probably be imple-
mented over several years. Building on the Geneva 
Plan of Action it would in all likelihood include tem-
porary restrictions on the Iranian nuclear programme, 
special transparency measures and procedures for 
gradually relaxing sanctions. 
53  Carmen Wunderlich, Andrea Hellmann, Daniel Müller, 
Judith Reuter and Hans-Joachim Schmidt, “Non-aligned 
Reformers and Revolutionaries: Egypt, South Africa, Iran and 
North Korea”, in Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control, ed. 
Müller and Wunderlich (see note 1), 246–295 (271 f.). 
54  Oliver Meier, European Efforts to Solve the Conflict over Iran’s 
Nuclear Programme: How Has the European Union Performed? Non-
Proliferation Papers 27 (N.p.: Non-Proliferation Consortium, 
February 2013), 
http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferation
papers/olivermeier51191b5bdb350.pdf (accessed 25 Septem-
ber 2014). 
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Ahead of the Ninth NPT Review Conference 
Ahead of the Ninth NPT Review Conference 
An agreement in the nuclear dispute would lend 
momentum to the upcoming review conference in 
New York in April/May 2015. That is urgently needed 
in view of the difficult environment for the four-week 
meeting. The diplomats will face two main tasks: to 
assess progress in implementation of the treaty goals, 
and to agree further measures to strengthen the 
regime. 
The last review conference in 2010 agreed sixty-four 
measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, 
but little progress has been made on their implemen-
tation. The nuclear weapons states have reached no 
new agreements on reducing the 16,300 nuclear weap-
ons in existence across the world. Russia and the United 
States, which between them own more than 90 per-
cent, have held no more new disarmament talks since 
signing the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New 
START) in April 2010. The Ukraine crisis further dimin-
ished the prospects for treaty-based reductions of US 
and Russian nuclear arsenals. At the same time, all 
the nuclear weapons states are investing in the moder-
nisation of their nuclear arsenals, and China is even 
building more nuclear weapons. At the conference 
many non-nuclear-weapon states are likely to again 
sharply criticise this breach of the disarmament 
promise in Article 6 of the NPT. 
Nor have the states parties implemented the deci-
sion of the last review conference to hold a conference 
on a Middle East nuclear- and WMD-free zone by 2012. 
While the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons 
represented a step in that direction, civil war in Syria 
and violence and political instability across other 
states in the region means there is little prospect of a 
successful regional dialogue on biological, chemical 
and nuclear weapons disarmament. In 2013 Egypt 
walked out of the preparatory committee for the 
review conference in protest over the lack of pro-
gress.55 At the review conference itself many Middle 
Eastern states will criticise the omission of Israel’s 
nuclear potential from the agenda. 
Iran’s neighbours will play an important role at 
the review conference. Much will depend on how they 
assess the progress of the nuclear talks. If regional 
rivals like Saudi Arabia conclude that an agreement 
55  Elaine M. Grossman, “Egypt Stages Walkout over Failure 
to Convene Mideast WMD Summit”, Global Security Newswire, 
30 April 2013, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/egypt-stages-
walkout-over-failure-convene-mideast-wmd-summit (accessed 
28 July 2014). 
fails to offer adequate protections against an Iranian 
nuclear bomb they are also liable to remain more 
critical towards a general strengthening of the non-
proliferation regime.56 But if the talks fail and Iran’s 
nuclear programme expands unchecked they are 
much more likely to turn their backs on the non-
proliferation regime. 
Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime 
The talks on Tehran’s nuclear programme have high-
lighted certain areas of non-proliferation where there 
is particular need for action and others where the 
prospects for initiatives to strengthen the non-pro-
liferation regime are best. 
The Additional Protocol stands at the heart of efforts 
to improve the IAEA’s verification capabilities. The 
crisis over Iran’s nuclear programme has again under-
lined the value of this instrument. As long as the coun-
try refused to implement its Additional Protocol, the 
IAEA lacked important means to search for undeclared 
facilities. The additional reporting requirements and 
access rights anchored in the Protocol were points of 
reference in the talks with Tehran. 
The EU member-states and other Western countries 
have worked – to date unsuccessfully – to make the 
Additional Protocol the verification standard for all 
non-nuclear-weapon states.57 They should not abandon 
this objective. Today 124 IAEA members implement 
an Additional Protocol, but a number of states with 
significant nuclear facilities – like Argentina, Brazil, 
Egypt, North Korea and Syria – still do not, and refuse 
to make it the new verification standard.58 The reasons 
for this stance have nothing to do with the Iranian 
nuclear programme. Argentina and Brazil, for example, 
link acceptance of stricter verification rules to pro-
gress on nuclear disarmament, while Egypt insists 
56  Yuval Steinitz, “Iran Deal Could Encourage, Rather than 
Limit, Nuclear Activity”, Washington Post, 1 March 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/iran-deal-could-
encourage-rather-than-limit-nuclear-activity/2014/02/28/ 
74cc36ee-9d71-11e3-9ba6-800d1192d08b_story.html. 
57  The final document of the 2010 review conference there-
fore merely notes that many states regard an Additional 
Protocol as an integral component of the safeguards system, 
and calls upon states to implement existing legal require-
ments. “Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference” 
(see note 5), paragraph 17 f. 
58  The current status of implementation of the Additional 
Protocol can be found at http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/ 
documents/AP_status_list.pdf (accessed 25 September 2014). 
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that Israel first join the NPT. So progress is not to be 
expected here even if the Iranian nuclear conflict is 
resolved. And were Iran to ratify and implement its 
Additional Protocol, it might at least have to revise 
its stance that the instrument is discriminatory. 
It would be sensible for the review conference (as 
in 2010) to call upon those states that have signed 
but not yet ratified an Additional Protocol to apply 
the instrument provisionally. Here the Iranian example 
can have a positive effect.59 Also in relation to the 
state-specific approach and a sharper focussing of 
IAEA verification activities, the Iran story can con-
tribute to improving the prospects for reform 
initiatives. 
The review conference should also reiterate that 
a comprehensive safeguards agreement provides the 
IAEA with a mandate to search for undeclared nuclear 
facilities and materials.60 Moreover, the states parties 
could underline the importance of transparency 
measures for effective monitoring of civilian nuclear 
programmes. The review conference should also note 
that early notification of plans to construct new nu-
clear facilities is a central precondition for effective 
verification, and confirm that safeguards agreements 
and subsidiary arrangements apply permanently and 
cannot be revised unilaterally by the implementing 
state. The IAEA’s expanded powers to investigate 
possible military dimensions of nuclear programmes 
in non-nuclear-weapon states should be acknowledged 
and further action proposed to establish and expand 
corresponding capabilities. 
The nuclear talks with Iran concentrate on meas-
ures to limit proliferation-sensitive activities. But the 
NPT framework offers very few starting points for 
anchoring such steps multilaterally. A long-term or 
even permanent renunciation of plutonium repro-
cessing by Tehran – as proposed in the JPOA – would 
send an important message: a country with a signifi-
cant nuclear programme ceasing proliferation-sen-
sitive activities for the sake of confidence-building. 
In their national statements the states parties should 
therefore acknowledge cases where NPT members 
have restricted their nuclear programmes in order to 
reduce the risk of military misuse. In this connection 
the review conference could also call for potentially 
weapons-grade fissile materials to be converted as 
59  “Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference” 
(see note 5), “Action 28”, 25. 
60  The final documents of earlier review conferences already 
contained corrsponding statements; for example “Final Docu-
ment of the 2010 Review Conference” (see note 5). 
quickly and comprehensively as possible into less pro-
liferation-sensitive forms.61 One model would be the 
Iranian promise to convert uranium hexafluoride into 
uranium oxide (fuel rods). 
The discussion over international nuclear fuel 
supply guarantees as one element of a solution for 
the nuclear dispute with Iran has confirmed that prag-
matic approaches are the most promising. Yet the 
linkage of Iran-specific models with a general initia-
tive for creating multinational guarantees has not had 
any positive impact on the non-proliferation regime – 
although multinational initiatives to assure Iran’s 
supply of nuclear fuel are still being discussed as part 
of a package solution.62 In this connection the review 
conference should note that a fuel bank administered 
by the IAEA could contribute to providing non-nuclear-
weapon states with a reliable supply of nuclear fuel. 
To prevent a watering down non-proliferation 
standards, the NPT members should emphasise that 
multinational mechanisms are open only to states 
that have answered all the IAEA’s outstanding ques-
tions about their nuclear programmes. But introduc-
ing additional conditions for participation would not 
be helpful, as they would be perceived as paternal-
ism.63 
Recommendations for German Policy 
The actions of the European Union, the E3 and Ger-
many in the nuclear conflict with Tehran are a success 
story. Europe’s early and assertive intervention played 
a major role in keeping the idea of military strikes 
against Iran’s nuclear facilities off the table inter-
nationally. At the same time, German and European in-
fluence are also responsible for the debate about moni-
toring and limiting the Iranian nuclear programme 
being conducted on the basis of the non-proliferation 
regime. It is yet to be seen whether this success story 
will have a happy ending. 
One major German contribution should be to place 
the non-proliferation lessons of the nuclear conflict in 
the context of an effective multilateralism. It is natural 
that initiatives to bring Iran back into the internation-
61  Such a move could affect the German FRM-II research 
reactor at Garching, which is operated with highly enriched 
uranium. 
62  Nunn, “Open a Nuclear Fuel Bank” (see note 46). 
63  Harald Müller, Die Stabilität des nuklearen Nichtverbreitungs-
regimes: Stand und Optionen, HSFK-Report 11/2009 (Frankfurt: 
HSFK, 2009), 24. 
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Recommendations for German Policy 
al system concentrate on measures to verify and limit 
the country’s nuclear programme. But for most NPT 
states, obligations to strengthen non-proliferation, 
which apply above all to the non-nuclear-weapon states, 
are only one side of the deal laid out in the treaty. 
They therefore also call for progress in nuclear dis-
armament and for the nuclear weapons states to be 
more transparent. 
Here Germany possesses great credibility, for it has 
long and consistently pushed for global nuclear dis-
armament and for greater transparency over existing 
arsenals. As well as the general actions described 
above, a number of specific recommendations for 
German non-proliferation policy can also be derived: 
 Germany should argue for the negotiations over a 
long-term agreement with Tehran to be used also 
to strengthen arms control instruments. Berlin should 
insist that all participants in the talks between the 
E3+3 and Iran ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). China, Iran and the United 
States have signed the treaty but not ratified it. 
All NPT resolutions call for entry into force of this 
treaty as the most important disarmament meas-
ure. Such a step would therefore also contribute to 
anchoring an agreement with Iran within the NPT. 
 The treatment of the Iranian nuclear programme 
has led to improvements in non-proliferation rules 
and procedures. In certain cases these could also 
have the character of precedents. It is therefore 
important that Iran receives no special rights or privi-
leges in the context of a possible long-term solution. 
This applies in particular to the supply of nuclear 
technology. Germany has an interest in minimising 
the number of states acquiring their own enrich-
ment or reprocessing capacities. This can only be 
achieved on the basis of multilateral rules and if no 
new double standards are created. 
 Germany, as the only non-nuclear-weapon state in 
the E3+3, bears a special responsibility for investiga-
tion of possible military activities being comprehensive 
and sufficiently transparent. The non-nuclear-
weapon states in the NPT have a right to hear what 
progress Iran has made towards the construction 
of nuclear weapons, who assisted it, and what will 
happen to the technologies it developed. Germany 
should push for these questions to be answered 
after implementation of a possible agreement in 
such a way that all NPT members can make their 
own judgement about the outcome of the IAEA 
investigation. 
 Germany should increase its financial support 
to the IAEA, which has not been exempted from 
Berlin’s general “zero real growth” policy, which 
rejects growth in the net budgets of international 
organisations.64 It should be remembered that ful-
filling additional verification responsibilities in 
Iran under the JPOA costs about €6.5 million for 
ten months.65 While it can be assumed that donors 
with relevant interests will always come forward 
to fund such one-off tasks, it would make sense to 
increase the regular budget to a point where the 
Agency can afford such activities without extra-
budgetary contributions. This would also help to 
defuse accusations that particular members are 
using instrumentalising the Agency for their own 
ends.66 
 Germany should also support strengthening the 
IAEA’s ability to investigate military research. To 
date it has always created such capacities ad hoc 
when there was a concrete need. These capacities 
should be consolidated, especially with an eye to 
later investigation of cases such as Syria or North 
Korea. This would deflect the accusation that the 
IAEA is only called to resolve non-proliferation 
crises when this appears opportune to the most 
powerful states.67 
These steps could also encourage opportunities to 
strengthen the non-proliferation regime growing out 
of the Iranian nuclear crisis. Whether it proves pos-
sible to make use of these possibilities will depend 
largely on Tehran. Regardless of the outcome of the 
nuclear talks, however, one should already be think-
64  In the IAEA’s 2013 budget negotiations Berlin did not 
oppose real growth of 0.3 percent. Between 2011 and 2013 
Germany voluntary provided the IAEA with an additional 
sum of almost €12 million. Stefan Kapferer, “Germany – 
National Statement: 57th Session of the IAEA General Con-
ference”, Vienna, 17 September 2013, http://www.iaea.org/ 
About/Policy/GC/GC57/Statements/germany.pdf (accessed 
8 October 2014). 
65  Frederik Dahl, “IAEA Says Needs More Money to Monitor 
Iran Nuclear Deal Extension – Document”, Reuters, 25 July 2014. 
66  Jessica C. Varnum, “Responsible for Verifying Iran Nuclear 
Deal, IAEA Lacks Reliable Support”, World Politics Review, 29 
January 2014, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/ 
13534/responsible-for-verifying-iran-nuclear-deal-iaea-lacks-
reliable-support (accessed 30 July 2014). 
67  Friedrich Gröning and Wolfgang Rudischhauser, “Die 
Organe der IAEO und ihr Umgang mit dem Iran und anderen 
aktuellen Krisen”, in 50 Jahre Internationale Atomenergie-Organi-
sation IAEO. Ein Wirken für Frieden und Sicherheit im nuklearen 
Zeitalter, ed. Dirk Schriefer, Walter Sandtner and Wolfgang 
Rudischhauser (Baden-Baden, 2007), 32–57 (45). 
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ing about measures by which nuclear weapons can be 
more effectively controlled. The experience with Iran 
could supply valuable lessons. 
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CSA Comprehensive safeguards agreement 
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CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
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E3+3 France, Germany, United Kingdom + China, Russia, 
United States 
FRM II Forschungsreaktor München II (German research 
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GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office 
HSFK Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung 
(Frankfurt am Main) 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna) 
INMM Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 
JPOA Joint Plan of Action (24 November 2013) 
LEU Low-enriched uranium 
NAM Non-Aligned Movement 
NPDI Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative 
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
PMD Possible military dimension 
SWU Separative work unit 
TRR Tehran Research Reactor 
UF6 Uranium hexafluoride 
UNMOVIC United Nations Monitoring, Verification and 
Inspection Commission 
UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission 
VERTIC Verification Research, Training and Information 
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WMD Weapon(s) of mass destruction 
SWP Berlin 
Implications of the Nuclear Conflict with Iran for the  
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime 
November 2014 
 
 
22 
